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Reality
DREW S. DAYS, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
As quickly as the twinkling of an eye, Professor Epstein acknowl-
edges dutifully America's history of discrimination against African-
Americans and passes on.1 This strategy is central to the overall
scheme of his impressive assault upon Title VII.2 For it is designed
to persuade the reader that the history of discrimination has no sig-
nificant impact upon the current socio-economic status of blacks and
their chances for improving that condition, and that racial discrimi-
nation is largely a relic of the past. With this obstacle out of the
way, the force of his overall argument, if not much of his rhetoric,
about the blight of government regulation of discrimination in the
workplace seems almost irresistible.
What could be fairer and more sensible, under these circum-
stances, than leaving it to the marketplace to bring willing employers
and applicants together to make mutually beneficial deals? Why
should black job-seekers care if some employers desire to discrimi-
nate, if they can easily find, or be found by, other employers (even
other blacks) who will view their racial identity as irrelevant, if not a
preferred characteristic? In any event, bottom-line considerations
will ultimately cause most, if not all, of the firms that discriminate to
go under. What could be more poetic? But for those who, like me,
decline to accept Professor Epstein's invitation to dismiss history and
ignore present realities, his argument loses much of its overall
seductiveness.
* Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law, Yale University. Professor Days is currently
servicing as Solicitor General.
1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 1 n.1 (1992) [hereinafter FORBIDDEN GROUNDS].
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-5
(1988).
His second strategic move is to offer up an incorrect and unrealis-
tic picture of how Title VII law works in racial, as well as in other,
discrimination cases. Professor Epstein's fundamental quarrel is re-
ally not with the Supreme Court for "legislatively" expanding the
application of Title VII beyond bounds set by Congress. Presumably,
had he found the Court's rulings entirely faithful to the intent of
Congress or had Congress ratified what the Court has done, he
would still find Title VII unacceptable.
Nevertheless, since his argument for "deregulation" of employ-
ment discrimination requires exaggerating Title VII's warts, his
story is one of largely unmitigated, inefficient government interfer-
ence with employer freedom of contract. It fails to acknowledge that
Title VII, although most assuredly a brake on unbridled employer
discretion to hire, promote, and fire at will, does not ignore employer
prerogatives altogether.
Professor Epstein's failure to take the history of racial discrimina-
tion seriously and to portray accurately the workings of Title VII
law leads me to question whether the goal of Forbidden Grounds is
truly to point America in the direction of greater employment oppor-
tunities for blacks. Rather, it seems more intent on disparaging a
regulatory framework that, while hardly without its problems, con-
tinues to offer genuine prospects for economic growth and economic
inclusion to those previously barred from meaningful representation
in the workplace because of the color of their skin.
II. TITLE VII - THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Professor Epstein's thesis is that, freed of the formal strictures of
Jim Crow laws and the informal pressures designed to maintain the
regime of "separate-but-equal," firms would sort themselves out
through market forces into those that operated on a racially non-
discriminatory basis and those that did not. In time, he argues, that
sorting-out process would likely result in most firms being driven by
the bottom line to hire without regard to race. Those that persisted
in excluding candidates would either fail or survive for idiosyncratic
reasons.3 This attractive scenario of, in essence, the "withering
away" of racial discrimination becomes rather problematic, however,
when placed in the appropriate historical context. Put simply, what
reason did Congress have to believe in 1964 that the market would
effect a self-correction?
The answer, I would suggest, is almost nothing. Congress, unlike
Professor Epstein, was sensitive to the organic character of racial
discrimination in America. It recognized that movement with respect
3. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 37-38.
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to discrimination in employment would not likely occur without sig-
nificant changes in housing, education, public accommodations, and
voting. Those changes had not begun seriously by the time the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 became law.
A. Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964
In the field of education, although Brown v. Board of Education4
had declared public school segregation unconstitutional a decade
earlier, implementation of that decision in the Southern and border
states was facing fierce resistance at the primary-secondary as well
as higher education levels.5 In the meantime, black children were
being denied the physical, financial, and human resources that would
enable them to compete on an equal footing with their white coun-
terparts. They were also unable to take advantage of formal and in-
formal networks available to whites to facilitate their obtaining
further training and employment.
Discrimination in the provision of public accommodations was also
a problem - not only in the South but in other parts of the country
as well. Blacks were consequently restricted in their ability to travel,
generally, and to engage, more specifically, in seeking, accepting,
and performing employment outside their home communities. Al-
though there were state and local laws in some jurisdictions prohibit-
ing discrimination in the provision of public accommodations6 and
Supreme Court decisions had declared illegal certain forms of racial
discrimination connected with interstate travel,7 no federal law dealt
with the issue comprehensively.
The Supreme Court prohibited the enforcement of racially restric-
tive covenants in 1948,8 but discrimination in housing was wide-
spread throughout the country. Congress would not address that
issue until it enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968.1 Segregation in
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (opposing desegregation of Little Rock
public schools); CHARLAYNE HUNTER-GAULT, IN MY PLACE (1992).
6. See Marion A. Wright, Public Accomodations: The Sit-in Movement: Progress
Report and Prognosis, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 87 (1965); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FREEDOM TO THE FREE: CENTURY OF EMANCIPATION, 1863-
1963: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 182-83 (1963); JOSEPH P. WITHERSPOON, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 12, 467-68 (1968).
7. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454
(1960); Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373 (1946); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
8. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
9. Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
housing limited the ability of black families to seek out communities
where their children would be able to attend resource-rich majority
white schools. To the extent that jobs were moving from areas of
black concentration to largely white, suburban or rural communities,
the unavailability of housing for blacks prevented them from moving
along with the jobs, as could whites.' 0
The Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first such legislation since Re-
construction, attempted to break the stranglehold that the Southern
political establishment had on blacks' efforts to exercise the
franchise." However, Congress became aware with the passage of
further voting rights legislation in 1960 and 1964 that opponents of
voting rights for blacks were effectively exploiting the litigation pro-
cess to delay and frustrate any meaningful change in the status quo.
It was not until 1965 that a federal law was enacted that shifted the
burden of time and inertia from the victims of discrimination in vot-
ing to the perpetrators.' 2 Consequently, it was not realistically within
the power of blacks through the use of the political process to begin
altering conditions that, even after the official fall of state-imposed
racial segregation, perpetuated discriminatory practices. Moreover,
white political control translated into limited employment opportuni-
ties for blacks within government and limited support for private
black enterprises, in terms of grants and contracts.' 3
In the employment area, the federal government had, since the
administration of Franklin Roosevelt, attempted to increase opportu-
nities for blacks among firms to which it awarded contracts. 4 How-
ever, since the policy had no effective enforcement mechanism,
progress was rather slow and uneven.' 5 At the same time, federal
grants were being awarded to state and local governments and pri-
vate entities with no strings attached insofar as prohibitions against
racial discrimination were concerned.' 6
One must add to this picture the widespread and violent resistance
throughout the South to efforts of the Civil Rights Movement and
§§ 3601-3619 (1992).
10. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 9.1, at 592 n.19, 593
n.20 (2d ed. 1980).
11. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1992)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
13. See generally Petitioners Brief for Fullilove v. Kreps, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(No. 78-1007).
14. Exec. Order No. 8802, 41 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
15. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT 103-42 (1966).
16. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 24-26 (1964); Charles F.
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining "Discrimi-
nation", 70 GEO. L.J. 1 (1981).
[VOL 31: 169. 1994] Reality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to eradicate racial segregation. 7 All
told, in 1964, Congress could see that the caste system of racial seg-
regation and discrimination remained largely intact, despite earlier
judicial and legislative assaults upon it. The Civil Rights Act of that
year, consequently, was one that attempted to address barriers to
equal opportunity for blacks not only in employment but also in vot-
ing, public accommodations, school desegregation, and federal finan-
cial assistance. In order to monitor the progress of civil rights
enforcement, Congress granted permanent status to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, established by the Civil Rights
Act of 1957.18
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to imagine how the market
could possibly have addressed meaningfully the systematic exclusion
of blacks from equal employment opportunities. Professor Epstein is
willing to concede that Title VII may have been required to remove
the legal and community limitations upon the ability of firms to hire
blacks."9 As the foregoing should establish, however, enactment of
federal legislation was not likely to achieve this result overnight.
Moreover, given the long history of subjugation and segregation of
blacks in education, housing, voting, and employment, there is every
reason to believe that many whites continued to view blacks as less
acceptable and less worthy candidates for jobs that had traditionally
been closed to them. Finally, assuming the very best of intentions of
whites and the best of will on the part of blacks, structural impedi-
ments presented by segregated education and housing, in particular,
severely restricted the scope of blacks' search for employment.
17. See generally Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); ATLANTA, GEOR-
GIA, 1960-1961: SIT-INS AND STUDENT ACTIVISM (David Garrow ed., 1989); BIRMING-
HAM. ALABAMA, 1956-1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (David Garrow
ed., 1989); DAVID GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978); HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORI-
GINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972, at 121-57 (1992).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975a-1975d, Title V (1988)).
19. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 142, 251.
B. From 1964 to the Present
It would be irresponsible to contend that conditions for African-
Americans have not improved since 1964. They have in certain re-
spects.20 However, nothing like a sea-change has occurred in the sta-
tus of blacks relative to whites. Blacks continue to occupy the lower
rungs on every socio-economic indicator.21 The reasons for this situa-
tion are complex but continuing racial discrimination and segrega-
tion cannot be overlooked among them. Professor Epstein quite
properly notes the success of efforts to desegregate places of public
accommodations pursuant to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.22 However, that experience does not, in my estimation, provide
sufficient support for his theory that antidiscrimination legislation
should seek only to remove formal and informal constraints on the
20. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLCY 109 (1987) ("The most notable gains [of blacks in recent
years] have occurred in professional employment, income of married-couple families,
higher education, and home ownership."); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993, at 85 (113th ed. 1993) (life expectancy rates
improved from 1970-1971); id. at 753 (educational attainment; improvement from 1960-
1992 in the number of blacks completing 4 years or more of high school and 4 years or
more of college). But see Tom Morganthau, Race on Campus: Failing the Test?, NEWS-
WEEK, May 6, 1991, at 27 (citing American Council on Education statistics, stating that
"[o]nly 811 doctorate degrees were awarded to blacks in 1989, compared with 1,056
given in 1979" and that "[i]n 1976, 6.6 percent of all master's degrees went to blacks;
only 4.6 percent were awarded in 1989").
21. THE METROPOLITIAN AREA FACT BOOK: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF
BLACKS/WHITES IN URBAN AMERICA 2-12 (Katherine MeFate ed. 1988) (noting that in
all 48 metro areas included in this fact book, census figures indicate that: unemployment
is more than twice as high among blacks than whites; the average earnings and median
incomes of black households are lower than those of white households within the same
metropolitan areas; significantly fewer blacks than whites own their own homes, and
black-owned homes are on average lower in value than white-owned homes; blacks are
less likely to be college educated; and blacks are more likely than whites to live in fe-
male-headed households and in families with incomes below the poverty level); U.S. BU-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 20, at 85 (life expectancy rates of blacks are
consistently lower than those of whites); id. at 153 (the percentage of blacks and whites
and years of school completed are significantly lower among blacks, especially in post-
secondary schooling); id. at 197 (crime victimization rates for crimes against persons
from 1973-1991 are consistently higher for blacks than for whites); id. at 210 (in 1991
blacks made up 47.3 % of state prison inmates); id. at 457 (monthly income of blacks,
specifically the median income in current dollars, is consistently lower among blacks than
whites from 1970-1991); id. at 471 (in 1991, 32.7% of black people lived below poverty
level, compared to 11.3% of white people); also the U.S. Bureau of the Census has
stated:
In the 1990 Census, African-Americans represented 10.4% of the total civil
labor force; yet they represented 20.4% of those workers with no earnings in
1989.
Among those without a high school diploma or GED, African-Americans
were over-represented as they composed 14.8% of this group. And among
those with a college degree or more African-Americans comprise only 6.1 %.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION SOURCE TAPES.
22. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 127.
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employment market. The transitory and impersonal nature of inter-
racial contact in restaurants and hotels differs profoundly from that
necessitated in an employment context. Hence white resistance may
not be nearly so strong in the former as in the latter.
The Supreme Court long ago acknowledged voting rights as fun-
damental because they are "preservative of all rights."23 As previ-
ously noted, Congress enacted comprehensive voting rights
legislation in 1965, having concluded that earlier efforts in 1957,
1960, and 1964 had done little to alter the systematic denial of
blacks' access to the franchise. One of the key features of that legis-
lation was a preclearance mechanism that required covered jurisdic-
tions, mostly in the South, to obtain federal approval before altering
their election schemes.24
Although a potentially potent weapon, the scope of the
preclearance provision was not clarified by the Supreme Court for
several years after the Act went into effect.25 Enforcement also has
not been systematic, because of differing philosophies from adminis-
tration to administration and resource limitations across administra-
tions.2" It also has been the target of a series of legal challenges over
the years that have caused enforcement efforts to be suspended for
significant periods of time pending resolution of the litigation.
The slow pace of change in the electoral picture for blacks
prompted Congress to extend the Voting Rights Act in both 1970
and 1975, strengthening certain of its provisions and extending its
geographic focus significantly to include other parts of the country
outside the "Deep South."28 Even with that expansion, however,
most of the country was not subject to preclearance requirements. In
some jurisdictions that were, no changes were made in electoral
schemes that would require submission for federal approval. Al-
though another, more general, provision of the Voting Rights Act
prohibiting racial discrimination with respect to voting existed, it
23. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 351, 360 (1886).
24. Drew S. Days, III, Section 5 Enforcement and the Department of Justice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN TWENTY-FIVE
YEAR PERSPECTIVE 52-53 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [herein-
after CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING].
25. Id. at 54-55.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 116-17 (1978).
28. See GRAHAM, supra note 17, at 121-57; see generally COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, USING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1976); David H. Hunter, The 1975 Voting
Rights Acts and Language Minorities, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 250 (1976).
was not the subject of much litigation until 1982.29 In that year,
Congress amended the law again to provide blacks, and members of
other racial minorities, with a more effective tool in challenging elec-
toral schemes that systematically blocked meaningful political
participation.3"
As the Voting Rights Act approaches thirty, it deserves to be re-
garded as the most effective piece of federal civil rights legislation on
the books.3 1 There have been significant increases in black access to
the ballot box and in representation in both elective and appointive
offices at all levels of government. 3 This success, however, has come
only through the coordinated efforts of Congress, the Executive
Branch, and the federal judiciary, especially during the last ten
years.33
This is far from saying that the Voting Rights Act has completed
the job of making the American political system one of racial inclu-
sion rather than of racial exclusion. Indeed, recent events suggest
practices that once effectively excluded blacks from the ballot box
and then from elective office have now appeared within elective bod-
ies themselves where blacks have recently gained representation.3 4
Moreover, black electoral successes have occurred primarily in small
communities and major metropolitan areas where racial segregation
is most pronounced. 5 In all too many cases, black elected officials
have been given the dubious honor of presiding over communities in
economic distress. The jobs have fled, the tax base is dwindling, and
infrastructures are crumbling, while demands for social services
skyr6cket.36
Despite the promise of Brown that schools would be desegregated
to comply with the Constitution, Southern and Border states em-
ployed a host of strategies to frustrate the dismantling of their de
jure systems.37 Moreover, it became clear in the seventies, although
29. Prior to 1982, Supreme Court rulings had restricted the reach of the Voting
Rights Act severely. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
30. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Rep-
resentation, ih CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 24, at 66, 70-73.
31. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
32. THE QUIET REVOLUTION: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (Chandler
Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE QUIET REVOLUTION].
33. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 1 (1993).
34. Presley v. Etowah County Comm., 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
35. THE QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 32.
36. Ronald Smother, Racially Divisive Campaign in Memphis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 1991, at A14; Lynne Duke, Denvers First Black Mayor Symbolizes His City's Disre-
gard for Racial Politics, WASH. POST, July 1, 1991, at A5.
37. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATING THE NATION'S
SCHOOLS (1979); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON METROPOLITAN
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1977); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AF-
TER BROWN: EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1975); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
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hotly denied earlier, that intentional segregation of public schools
was not merely a Southern phenomenon. Litigation in the North and
West, where state-imposed segregation never had existed or had
been abolished decades earlier, established that school officials had
created and maintained arrangements designed to segregate black
and white children from one another. 8 By that time, however, demo-
graphic shifts had occurred in most urban areas, North and South,
creating largely black cities surrounded by largely white suburbs.
Although Supreme Court decisions, beginning in 1971, seemed
designed to speed along the process of desegregation within school
districts, 39 it imposed at the same time almost impossible burdens
upon blacks seeking to achieve interdistrict desegregation. With
few exceptions, this has left urban school districts intensely racially-
segregated and devoid of resources - because of shrinking tax bases
- to provide their students with academic and other support that
suburban districts take for granted.41 More recently, the Court has
shown an inclination toward relieving individual school districts of
the responsibility for achieving further desegregation on the grounds
that forces beyond their control were responsible for resegregation.
42
Another provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits dis-
crimination by recipients of federal funds. Although it was used ex-
tensively during the Johnson Administration to promote school
desegregation, subsequent enforcement has been uneven. 43 More re-
cently, Congress amended the provision to overrule a Supreme Court
decision that limited its reach."
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have recognized the
reciprocal relationship between school and housing discrimination:
schools are built where neighborhoods grow up, but neighborhoods
RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION OF THE
NATION'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1976); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION IN TEN COMMUNITIES (1973).
38. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Ohio); Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979) (Ohio); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973) (Denver).
39. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
41. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1992); GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CON-
SERVATIVE POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY 105-12 (1991).
42. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237 (1991).
43. Abernathy, supra note 16.
44. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, § 6, 102 Stat. 28, 35.
also grow up where schools are built.45 Consequently, school boards
have the power through the location, capacity, and grade level of
schools to control their racial composition and to affect surrounding
neighborhoods. School and housing authorities have also worked in
tandem to preserve segregated communities. 40 The problem of hous-
ing segregation encompasses more than schools, however. In 1968,
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act. Because of its inherent limi-
tations - particularly the absence of an administrative enforcement
mechanism - the 1968 Act did not make a significant impact upon
intense racial segregation in housing. 47 Even though it is well-estab-
lished that patterns of housing segregation are not explained entirely
by non-racial factors,48 the Fair Housing Act had limited success in
helping blacks break through the barriers that separate urban and
suburban communities. Congress amended the Act in 1988 to
strengthen both its federal government and private enforcement pro-
visions. 49 As a result, several significant private actions have been
successful, 50 but commentators question whether the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has acted vigorously to carry out
its new enforcement responsibilities. 1
Attempting to measure the current level of racial discrimination in
America, as compared to that in 1954 or 1964, is an illusive exercise.
One generalizes at some peril. Reports as fresh as the morning news-
paper recount studies showing continuing racial discrimination in
housing,52 in access to credit,53 in employment,54 and education, 55
45. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21; Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 216 (Douglas, J., concurring).
46. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
47. Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 (Sept. 13, 1988) (transcript available in Department of Justice Library); James A.
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The Second Generation of Fair
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1088 (1989); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW § 24.2 (1993).
48. Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE
L. & PoL'Y REV. 339 (1988).
49. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
50. Littlefield v. McGuffey, 979 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1992); Spann v. Colonial Vil-
lage, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 980 (1990); United
States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986);
Woods-Drake v. Landy, 667 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1982); Ragin v. Steiner, Clatemand &
Assocs., 714 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
51. Confirmation Hearing of Francis A. Keating, II, Hearings Before the Judici-
ary Committee of the United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 84-162 (1992) (testi-
mony of Elaine R. Jones, Kerry A. Scanlon, Lisa Mihaly, and Shanna L. Smith).
52. FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF GREATER WASHINGTON, RACE DISCRIMINATION
IN THE RENTAL HOUSING MARKET: A STUDY OF THE GREATER WASHINGTON, D.C.
AREA (1992); William F. Powers, $850,000 Award in Ad Bias Case, WASH. POST, May
15, 1992, at Fl; Christine Spolar, Bias Suit Nets $350,000, WASH. POST, May 28, 1992,
at Al; Sue A. Pressley, Cisneros Moves to Open Up Town in East Texas to Blacks,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1993, at A3; Tracy Thompson, Study Finds 'Persistent' Racial
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and showing what seems to be a resurgence of hate speech and racial
violence.56 Polls also reflect, although they should not be viewed as
conclusive, significantly negative attitudes of whites toward blacks.57
The intensely segregated nature of education and housing is a fact of
life in America. Taken as a whole, this picture makes it hard to view
racial discrimination as a historical relic. It suggests that past prac-
tices of segregation and discrimination continue to affect white atti-
tudes and black conditions today and that those attitudes
undoubtedly influence behavior.
Bias in Area's Rental Housing, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1991, at Dl; Michael Quint, Ra-
cial Gap Found on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at D1; Ann Mariano, Blacks
Having Difficult Time Buying Homes, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1990, at El; MARGERY A.
TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST. & SYRACUSE UNIV., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY (1991); Scott Minerbrook,
Home Ownership Anchors the Middle Class, EMERGE 42-48 (1993).
53. David. S. Hilzenrath, Study Sees Mortgage Loan Bias, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
1991, at Fl; Quint, supra note 52; Mariano, supra note 52; Alicia H . Munnell, et al.,
Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, Oct. 1992; Joel G. Brenner &
Liz Spayd, Bankers Describe Roots of Bias, WASH. POST, Jun. 8, 1993, at Al; Doug
Bailey, Fed Finds a Racial Gulf in Mortgages, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1991, at Al;
Nathaniel C. Nash, Panel Is Told of Racial Bias in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1990,
at A18.
54. MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPOR-
TUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991) (using testers in a
study of employment discrimination against Hispanics); HARRY CROSS, URBAN INST..
EMPLOYER HIRING PRACTICES: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF HISPANIC AND ANGLO JOB
SEEKERS (1990) (finding young black job seekers denied jobs offered to similar white job
seekers 15% of the time); MARC BENDICK, JR. ET AL., FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL OF
GREATER WASHINGTON, INC., MEASURING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION THROUGH
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS (rev. 1993) (using employment "testing" or "auditing" to
discover that hiring discrimination remains far more prevalent than is commonly as-
sumed); Hiring Discrimination Against Young Black Men, URB. INST. POL'Y & RES.
REP., Summer 1991, at 4; Clare Ansberry, Few Firms Address Racism on the Job,
WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at Bl; Filomena Sayao, Black Executives: Racism No. I
Barrier, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1991, at 6B; A Glass Ceiling Thick as Lead: New Study
Shows Women and Minorities Barred from Rising Very High Up Corporate Ladder,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991, at B4; Joan E. Rigdon & Carol Hymowitz, For Black Men,
Success Resolves Few Problems, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1992, at BI.
55. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
56. CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, CAMPUS LIFE: IN
SEARCH OF COMMUNITY 25, 26-34 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech On Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2370-73 n.245-56 (1989).
57. See ToM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CTR., ETHNIC IMAGES,
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY TOPICAL REPORTS No. 19 (1990) (examining the images
whites have of various ethnic groups); Peter Appleborne, Racial Divisions Persist 25
Years After King Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at 16; Mark A. Fossett & K. Jill
Kiecolt, The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes, 70 Soc.
ScI. Q. 4 (1989); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHRISTIANS & JEWS, TAKING AMERICA'S
PULSE (1992).
It is against this backdrop that Professor Epstein would have us
allow the market to operate free of the constraints of Title VII. I
find it inconceivable that such an arrangement would be more
favorable to blacks seeking employment than is the current, regu-
lated system. Intentional acts of employment discrimination to one
side, although there are enough of those, it is difficult to identify
what strong reasons white employers would have to care whether
blacks are hired. Whether arbitrary barriers limit their eligibility or
whether education and housing segregation restrict the equal access
of blacks to jobs should be of no moment to them so long as ample
pools of white applicants exist.
III. TITLE VII As IT ACTUALLY OPERATES
Professor Epstein's second strategic move in aid of his overall the-
sis is to offer a caricatured portrait of Title VII. He would have the
reader believe that, in the nearly thirty-eight years since its passage,
the statute has grown into a monstrous restraint on employer auton-
omy, a promoter of explicit discrimination against whites, and an
ironic limit on employment opportunities for blacks. On the contrary,
until the Supreme Court's about-face decisions during the 1988-89
Term,"8 Title VII doctrine had been developing in a way that bal-
anced, fairly and sensibly, the imperative of addressing real
problems of racial discrimination and exclusions, on the one hand,
with the legitimate needs of employers to maintain some control over
the employment process on the other hand. In passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress restored that balance.59
Before discussing Title VII doctrines prior to 1989, I think that it
may be helpful to describe more clearly than Professor Epstein has
done in his book the several types of employment discrimination to
which the statute is addressed. The first is disparate impact discrim-
ination where an employer uses a screening device that has a dispro-
portionate impact on a racial group that cannot be justified in terms
of the requirements of the job in question. The second is individual
disparate treatment discrimination in which a person is denied con-
sideration for employment or promotion equal to others similarly
qualified because of that person's race or other characteristic prohib-
ited by Title VII. The third is class disparate treatment, or pattern
or practice, discrimination where an employer systematically denies
equal treatment to a group of people based upon prohibited criteria
58. See e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Lorance v,
AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
59. H.R. Con. Res. 9542-49, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (remarks of Congress-
man Hyde); George Bush, Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Nov. 22,
1991), in 226 DAILY LAB. REP., at D-1.
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under Title VII. Professor Epstein's discussion of Title VII case law
conflates the first, disparate impact, and the third, class disparate
treatment, in a way that masks the theoretical and practical distinc-
tions between the two models.
A. Disparate Impact
Professor Epstein argues that the Supreme Court's 1971 decision
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.60 ignored both the language and legis-
lative history of Title VII when it held that practices having a dispa-
rate impact on certain groups of applicants could violate the
statute.61 He contends, as have others over the years, that Title VII
was designed to deal with only intentionally discriminatory practices,
not those that simply had a discriminatory effect. Since Congress
incorporated the Griggs doctrine into Title VII in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,62 the debate over whether the Court "got it right"
twenty-three years ago is, in some senses, beside the point. What
really matters now, it seems to me, is whether the Griggs doctrine
represents a fair manner of sorting out considerations of remedying
discrimination while preserving certain employer prerogatives.
It is certainly true that Griggs was an unprecedented reading of
the statute. However, the interpretative principle that the Court in-
voked was not novel. In both voting rights cases and earlier lower
court decisions under Title VII, federal judges had embraced an
"anti-freezing" principle.63 That principle required that, as a matter
of equity, courts reject facially even-handed requirements that built
upon prior racial inequality, even without any finding that the
change was motivated by discriminatory intent. To do otherwise,
they held, would be to carry over such past discrimination well into
the future, since blacks and whites would be unequally prepared to
compete under the new "equality. '64
What the Court faced in Griggs was precisely that situation: given
the history of discrimination in North Carolina against blacks, par-
ticularly in its racially-segregated public schools, it was unlikely that
blacks would have educational credentials or test-taking skills equal
60. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. Id. at 431 (holding that Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation").
62. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
63. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (voting); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (employment).
64. United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969).
to whites.6 5 Of course, Duke Power Co., the employer, was not found
to have been responsible for the educational deficits experienced by
blacks. In that respect, the Griggs facts were distinguishable from
those in the earlier "anti-freezing" cases where the employers or
state officials were properly charged with disadvantaging blacks.
Nevertheless, assuming, as the Court properly did, that Title VII
was designed to open up opportunities previously denied to black
workers, it was fair to ask the employer to shoulder a part of the
burden for achieving progress in that regard. But the Court had sev-
eral options.
One response would have been for the Court to hold that disparate
impact, irrespective of its severity, would not constitute a violation of
Title VII. Rejected applicants would be required to establish the ex-
istence of discriminatory intent. Another would have been to accept
proof of disparate impact as evidence of a violation but require the
applicants to carry the burden of persuasion, or lose for failure to do
so, of demonstrating that the screening device at issue was not job-
related. The third approach, the one actually chosen by the Court,
was basically the second just mentioned, except that the employer
would have the burden of persuasion of demonstrating job-
relatedness.
The process of allocating evidentiary burdens in the law is not a
scientific exercise but rather one affected significantly by social reali-
ties and societal objectives.66 In the 1965 Voting Rights Act, for ex-
ample, Congress imposed on jurisdictions covered by the
preclearance provisions the burden of showing that their proposed
electoral changes both were not intended to discriminate and did not
have any discriminatory effect.6" Griggs pitted Duke Power Co.'s
purported need for employees with high school diplomas or
equivalent scores on general ability tests against the job prospects of
black applicants. Under these circumstances, the Court struck the
balance in favor of the side in the worse position to determine the
validity of these barriers to their employment. Employers were not
prohibited from using tests altogether, but were simply required to
demonstrate that their value outweighed the societal loss occasioned
by foreclosing job opportunities to black workers capable of perform-
ing the job in question. Such an allocation would, at the very least,
65. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & nn.5-6. The Court decided Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the same year.
66. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973); see also Robert Belton,
Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1359 (1990); Robert
Belton, Burdens on Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of
Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1981).
67. Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
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discourage employers from adopting tests without very much
thought and encourage them to analyze thoroughly their genuine
needs for such screening devices in the face of their discriminatory
impact.68
Moreover, whatever one's views on the utility of general ability
testing, the Griggs doctrine seems even fairer, as a matter of social
policy, where it serves to remove other barriers to employment, not
involving pencil and paper tests, that have little or no relation to the
fitness of black applicants for certain jobs. Yet, before Griggs, they
stood as significant limits on the ability of blacks to find employ-
ment. 69 Professor Epstein would, apparently, accept significant dis-
parate impact of tests in exchange for relatively modest returns in
terms of test validity.70 Presumably, he would also decry the applica-
bility of Griggs in non-test situations.
B. Individual Disparate Treatment
One would have expected the Supreme Court's first consideration
of Title VII's scope to be in a case where the plaintiff claimed to
have been the victim of intentional racial discrimination. However, it
was not until 1973, two years after the Griggs disparate impact deci-
sion, that the Court decided the case of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green."1 There it held that the plaintiff would have to establish, in
order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, that he was a
member of a racial minority, that he applied and was qualified for
the job in question, that he was rejected despite his qualifications,
and that after his rejection, the employer kept the position open and
continued to seek applications from persons with qualifications like
the plaintiff's.72 Once the plaintiff made out a prima facie case, the
employer's responsibility was to come forward with a legitimate,
non-discriminatory justification for rejecting the plaintiff.73 In the fi-
nal stage, the plaintiff could attempt to prove that the employer's
68. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1239 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J.,
dissenting in part), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
69. BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1987-1989, at Supp. 21-23 (N. Thompson Powers ed., 2d ed. 1991); Gregory v. Litton
Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
70. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 212-16.
71. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72. Id. at 802.
73. Id.
justification was in fact a pretext for discrimination.7 4 Unlike the sit-
uation in disparate impact cases, in individual disparate treatment
cases the burden of persuasion would remain with the plaintiff.75
Professor Epstein seems to be willing to live with individual dispa-
rate treatment cases, but largely because he views them as far less
harmful to employers' autonomy than are disparate impact cases.
His instincts are certainly right. In individual disparate treatment
cases, the employer can set his or her job requirements as high as the
stars so long as they are applied equally to white and black appli-
cants alike. Absent evidence of disparate impact, there is no duty
upon the employer to establish that the requirements are job-related.
Although it may seem somewhat odd that the plaintiff's prima facie
case burden is rather minimal, the employer's burden of explaining
his conduct is equally minimal. The allocation allows the court to
entertain two plausible theories about the facts at the same time.
First, the plaintiff's burden posits the existence of a rational em-
ployer seeking "efficient and trustworthy workmanship. 76 As the
Court remarked in a subsequent case in this regard:
And we are willing to presume this [prima facie case] largely because we
know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a
totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting. Thus when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant
have been eliminated as possible'reasons for the employer's actions, it is
more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with
some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as
race.
7
Consequently, once an applicant has established his or her qualifica-
tions for the job, the obvious non-discriminatory reason, lack of qual-
ification, has been removed from the picture. Second, the employer's
burden of production - to come forward with a legitimate non-dis-
criminatory justification - acknowledges that some employers may
act irrationally or have reasons for denying employment to the plain-
tiff that are dictated by factors unrelated to technical competence,
such as family relationship or even bureaucratic inefficiency. 78 In so
74. Id. at 804.
75. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
76. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
77. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
78. Cunningham v. Housing Auth. of Opelousas, 764 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1985)
(upholding decision that female plaintiff failed to demonstrate intentional discrimination
in hiring case because the less qualified male who got the position was hired as repay-
ment for political support he had lent to the mayor); Autry v. North Carolina Dep't of
Human Resources, 820 F.2d 1384 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that promotion of white em-
ployee, who was friend of interviewer who made promotion decision and daughter of
Bank Commission member with political ties, did not raise inference of intentional dis-
crimination against unpromoted black employee); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that Title VII does not apply to disparate treatment claims
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doing, the Court has achieved a reasoned balance between an em-
ployer's desire to hire whomever he or she wants with the goal of
"fair and neutral employment and personnel decisions. 179
Moreover, the tripartite allocation of evidentiary burdens an-
nounced by McDonnell-Douglas is a construct that rarely mirrors
the actual trial of such cases.80 The applicant need not rely solely
upon the prima facie case elements identified by the Court but may,
and probably will, introduce evidence of pretext. The employer,
through cross-examination, may challenge the applicant's qualifica-
tions before his or her turn comes to respond. The applicant may
utilize statistics with respect to the employer's overall hiring of
blacks to establish pretext in his or her individual case of racial dis-
crimination. Such evidence provides a context within which thejudge can evaluate the individual claims. In turn, the employer may
rely upon his or her overall hiring practices, including affirmative
action plans, to rebut evidence pointing to discrimination in the ap-
plicant's individual case. In general, as one might imagine given the
extent to which individual disparate treatment cases are no more
than swearing contests between applicant and employer, such cases
are not often successful.81 Professor Epstein is correct in viewing
them as only minor drags on employer autonomy.82
Finally, contrary to Professor Epstein's suggestion, the McDon-
nell-Douglas individual disparate treatment model has been applied
not only to racial minorities but to whites as well.83 It has long been
established that Title VII applies equally to whites and blacks.8 4
Courts have, however, been required to adjust the McDonnell-Doug-
las approach to those situations where, contrary to what one would
expect based upon America's history of racial discrimination against
blacks, there is some objective evidence that an employer would ac-
tively attempt to exclude qualified whites from consideration.85
based on promotion decisions motivated by favoritism towards relatives); Keyes v. Secre-
tary of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016 (1st Cir. 1988).
79. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
80. United States Postal Servs. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
81. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri L. Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991).
82. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 181.
83. Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. McDonald v. Santa Fe Ry., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
85. Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017-18.
C. Class Action Disparate Treatment
There are similarities between class action disparate treatment,
the third form of discrimination addressed by Title VII, and dispa-
rate impact, particularly in the reliance upon statistics as a form of
proof. Yet statistics play a different role in each. In disparate impact
cases, statistics are used to establish that a screening device is pro-
ducing a greater discriminatory effect with respect to black appli-
cants, for example, than white applicants. In class action disparate
treatment cases, statistics are used to suggest that hiring patterns
significantly lower than what one would normally expect in view of
the labor pool are the result of intentional discrimination rather than
chance.
The burden on the plaintiff class in such "pattern or practice"
cases is to persuade the court that "racial discrimination was the
company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than
the unusual practice."86 It is really the use of statistics in class ac-
tion disparate treatment cases that has drawn frequent criticism.
The critics take the position that differential hiring rates do not nec-
essarily suggest racial discrimination because it is common knowl-
edge that job interests vary, for example, from group to group.
Consequently, one should not expect that a particular work force will
mirror the racial group proportions existing in the labor pool." I as-
sume that Professor Epstein would have expressed similar views, if
he had addressed explicitly this type of case in his book.
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court offered the following pragmatic
response to that criticism: "[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to
be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time re-
sult in a work force more or less representative of the racial and
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which
employees are hired." 8 This proposition is certainly open to chal-
lenge. The Court did not mean to suggest that it was anything more
than one element of proof that a judge might rely upon when faced
with the task of determining the presence or absence of intentional
discrimination. Rather, it resolves the question of which party - the
plaintiffs who allege discrimination or the employer who denies any
bias - should have the responsibility for explaining what reasons,
other than discrimination, would likely account for significant dis-
parities between black labor pool and workforce statistics.
In view of the history of racial discrimination recounted above in
86. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
87. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 33, 36-37 (1992); TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM J. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RACE
(1979); Thomas Sowell, "Affirmative Action". A Worldwide Disaster, COMMENTARY,
Dec. 1989, at 21; THOMAS SOWELL. CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY (1984).
88. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20.
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Part II, the appropriate party to provide the court with explanations
should be the employer. The Court properly held in Teamsters, con-
sequently, that the employer was in the best position to explain why
white drivers, but not black, liked over-the-road (long distance) as-
signments that paid better than in-town jobs.8 9 This is not to say that
plaintiffs have been able to rely upon general population statistics in
every case to raise inferences of racial discrimination. On the con-
trary, the Court has made clear that where special qualifications or
other factors, such as geography, serve to limit the relevance and
probativeness of general population statistics, more appropriately tai-
lored demographic data must be proffered. 90 Moreover, the existence
of anecdotal evidence is usually crucial to the success of class dispa-
rate treatment cases. According to the Court, they help to bring "the
cold numbers convincingly to life."9 '
Professor Epstein's confusion between disparate impact and class
action disparate treatment cases, most notably in his discussion of
the cases involving multiple regression analysis to prove discrimina-
tion,912 causes him to misrepresent the burdens employers must carry.
In those and other class action disparate treatment cases, the plain-
tiffs have the burden of establishing discriminatory intent. Unlike in
the true, Griggs-type disparate impact cases, proof of discriminatory
effect does not satisfy the plaintiffs' evidentiary burden.93 Overall,
contrary to Professor Epstein's assertions, the three Title VII doc-
trines described above reflect a desire by the Supreme Court to ad-
vance the cause of racial equality in the workplace while
maintaining a healthy respect for the importance of traditional em-
ployer prerogatives.
D. Affirmative Action
In his discussion of "affirmative remedial action," '94 Professor Ep-
stein compounds the errors already mentioned with respect to his
casual discussion of the history of racial discrimination and confu-
sion over the difference between disparate impact and class disparate
89. Id. at 359-60.
90. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310-11 (1977).
91. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
92. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 367-91.
93. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part) (holding that plaintiffs must establish that racial discrimination was the standard
operating procedure).
94. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 405-11.
treatment cases. It is true that he mentions that remedial affirmative
action (my term) is designed "to remedy acts of discrimination that
the statute itself renders unlawful."95 This brief acknowledgement,
however, leaves untold (and unknown to those unfamiliar with this
field of law) the stories of often-persistent refusals by employers to
rectify proven cases of intentional racial discrimination.
The pattern has been as follows. Black plaintiffs sue the employer
alleging intentional racial discrimination. The employer denies the
allegations but is ultimately found liable under Title VII. After a
series of unsuccessful appeals, the employer is enjoined by the trial
court from discriminating further against blacks and ordered to en-
gage in a program of active recruitment to integrate its workforce.
Several years pass with very little change in the racial composition of
the employer's workforce.
The employer's explanation is that he or she is looking as hard as
anyone could ask but simply cannot find any blacks qualified for the
job or cannot convince those that are qualified to accept employ-
ment. According to the employer, its recruitment activities have been
a model of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. The court's
view is often otherwise where the employer's operation does not re-
quire sophisticated skills of its workers, there are relatively few black
employees, and the black labor pool of presumptively qualified candi-
dates is relatively large.
It is at this point that courts have resorted to goal and timetable,
and sometimes quota, remedies. Hence, employers are directed to
achieve a certain percentage of black workers by a given time. Even
where such orders are issued, employers retain the right to return to
court to report that the goals have not been reached and to explain
the reasons for failure. Of course, evidence that an employer has es-
tablished no formal mechanism for identifying, attracting, and eval-
uating black candidates will serve to undermine that employer's
credibility. The important point, however, is that this process does
not require employers to hire "by the numbers" without regard to
availability or qualifications, as has often been suggested by critics of
this form of affirmative action.96
Failure by the employer to achieve goals and timetables may
prompt the court to impose even more stringent requirements,
95. Id. at 405.
96. Carol H. Falk & Urban C. Lehner, Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, in
COUNTING BY RACE: EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER
170 (Terry Eastland & William J. Bennett eds., 1979); William B. Reynolds, An Equal
Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007, 1036-39 (1987); Eastland, supra note 87,
at 37; Sowell, supra note 87, at 21; Paul C. Roberts, America's War on Success, NAT'L
REV., Aug. 23, 1993, at 50.
[VOL 31: 169. 1994] Reality
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
namely, one-for-one or one-for-two black-white hiring or promo-
tion.97 Once again, this form of remedy does not mandate the em-
ployer's ignoring qualifications. Presumably, this arrangement is
what critics refer to as the imposition of "quotas" in the workplace.?8
The word "quota" has a justifiably pejorative connotation in view of
its association with flat limits on the number of Jews or other ethnic
group members accepted for employment or admission to institutions
of higher education, not only in Nazi Germany but also in our own
country only a few decades ago.99 It should be evident, however, that
the form of remedial affirmative action bears little resemblance to
those quotas of the past. Such court orders represent a measured
response to a history of proven discrimination and employer resis-
tance to less drastic remedial alternatives.
Goals and timetables and, even more so, the one-for-one remedial
orders present the question, as Professor Epstein points out,100 of
whether so-called non-victims of discrimination should benefit from
remedial affirmative action orders. Under normal circumstances,
remedies might well be limited to actual victims of discrimination
such as blacks who applied for employment but were rejected, those
who were employed but denied equal terms or conditions to those of
whites, or more problematic than these, blacks who would have ap-
plied for jobs but did not because of the employer's reputation as a
discriminator.10' However, where an employer has engaged in "par-
ticularly long standing or egregious discrimination,"'0 2 limiting relief
to actual victims may not suffice. For one thing, many of the actual
victims may have gone to their graves or may have taken other jobs
from which they are reluctant to move for a variety of reasons.
Moreover, employers guilty of persistent or growing patterns of
97. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-76 (1987).
98. SOWELL, supra note 87, at 41; see HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A
QUARTER CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 214-15 (1991); Kingsley R. Browne, Com-
parable Worth: An Impermissible Form of Affirmative Action?, 22 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
717, 732 n.95 (1989) (criticizing the distinction between goals and quotas as without
meaning); Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," a Codifi-
cation of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 287, 299 n.44 (stating that the Court upheld a quota system in United Steel
Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
99. Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard
College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pre-Text?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379
(1979).
100. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 408-09.
101. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977).
102. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986).
racial discrimination have institutional problems that can be ad-
dressed effectively only by institutional, not individual, remedies.
Goals and timetables, and even what I am prepared to call quotas
under my own definition, help alter the public image of the employer
as a professional discriminator and promote institutional change
from within. To do less is likely to result in situations where, as the
Supreme Court has noted, "informal mechanisms may obstruct
equal employment opportunities"'' 3 after formal discrimination has
ceased.
The central question in this respect must be whether the remedy,
whatever its name, responds properly to the discriminatory practices
that have been proven. Although these remedies are grounded in the
facts of discriminatory practices in each case, Professor Epstein im-
properly dismisses them as a "restructuring of society that takes into
account the interests of nonparties to the litigation in fashioning
remedies for breach." 04 Since these types of remedies are limited to
cases of "long standing or egregious discrimination," they are, by
definition, not available where the only violation is one of disparate
impact.
E. Intraracial Wealth Redistribution
Professor Epstein posits that another, in his long list, of Title VII's
untoward consequences has been the intraracial transfer of wealth
between well-off and poorer blacks. He suggests that in the same
way that increasing the minimum wage predictably decreases job op-
portunities for those with fewer skills, Title VII advantages better
educated, middle class blacks to the disadvantage of lower class
blacks. 10 5 It is difficult to know what to make of such a wholly specu-
lative claim. First, one can reasonably assert that the transfer, if it in
fact occurs, is rather modest, given the limited wealth accumulation
in the black community overall. 06 Second, it is highly inaccurate to
view middle class blacks and middle class whites as fungible, in view
of the significant disparity between the two groups in terms of
103. Id. at 449.
104. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 408.
105. Id. at 259-66.
106. WILLIAM P. O'HARE, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, WEALTH AND
ECONOMIC STATUS: A PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUITY (1983); Lenneal J. Henderson,
Empowerment Through Enterprise: African American Business Development, in THE
STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 102 (1993) (discussing the dependency of African American
businesses on public support, citing to the disparity between blacks and whites in wealth
ownership); Melvin J. Oliver & Thomas M. Schapiro, Race and Wealth, REV. OF BLACK
POL. ECON., Spring 1989, at 5, 17 (noting that black households have one-fourth the net
worth and I 1% of the net financial assets of white households).
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wealth accumulation as opposed to income. 107 Third, and more im-
portant, however, Professor Epstein's assertions attribute to Title VII
effects that undoubtedly have multiple causes.
Certainly blacks with competitive skills and education have been
able to benefit from passage of Title VII and its enforcement. In
contrast, significant segments of the black community who were poor
and uneducated before Title VII have not improved their lot since
the statute's passage. The failure of these blacks to advance is un-
likely to have been a consequence of Title VII but rather of the ab-
sence of social programs designed to improve the conditions that
leave them at the margins of the American economy. Inadequate
housing, inferior educational facilities, minimal health care, and the
deterioration of both physical and social institutions in our cities, not
Title VII, 0 8 better explain the widening gap between middle class
and poor blacks.
Professor Epstein's criticism of Title VII in this respect resembles
one frequently levelled at affirmative action generally. The conten-
tion is that affirmative action plans have not benefitted poor blacks
but have simply allowed middle class blacks, many of whom are un-
deserving of any special consideration because of their race, to ob-
tain scarce employment and higher educational opportunities."0 9 This
criticism is not entirely true, since blacks in blue collar industries
have been able to receive employment and training that would not
have been available to them had Title VII and affirmative action
programs not existed."10 Black students from rather humble socio-
economic backgrounds have also enjoyed expanded educational hori-
zons for the same reason."'
More important, however, is the fact that affirmative action pro-
grams were not designed to address the problem of poor people.
Rather, their objective was to help remedy the effects of discrimina-
tion against blacks because of their race. Many American institu-
tions still reflect a lack of diversity along socio-economic lines, with
107. O'HARE, supra note 106, at 3-8.
108. WILSON, supra note 20; WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE
OF RACE: BLACKS AND CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978).
109. See Abigail M. Thernstrom, 'Voting Rights' Trap, 193 NEW REPUBLIC, Sept.
2, 1985, at 21-23.
110. GERTRUDE EzORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE AC-
TION 63-65 (1991).
111. WILSON, supra note 20, at 115 (citing William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Pro-
tection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1714 (1986)).
the poor less represented the more elite the institution.' In contrast,
these same institutions, prior to Title VII and affirmative action, had
very little or no black presence, irrespective of blacks' socio-economic
background. 3 a Affirmative action plans have been somewhat suc-
cessful in remedying the absence of the black middle class from em-
ployment and educational opportunities previously available only to
middle class whites. Defenders of affirmative action who characterize
them as "poverty" programs are simply mistaken or disingenuous.
There is some irony, moreover, in this criticism of Title VII and
affirmative action as a middle class black windfall, since the same
critics also argue that selection should be based upon merit, not upon
race. Blacks most likely to have educational and employment qualifi-
cations competitive with whites are going to be middle class. Hence,
a "Catch-22" situation arises. If affirmative action programs were
targeted to poor blacks, they will be less likely as a group to have
sufficient credentials to be competitive. Indeed, if the concern is for
that segment of the black community popularly denominated the
"underclass," it is exceedingly doubtful that affirmative action pro-
grams offer any relief." 4 But if affirmative action programs focus on
race and competence, middle class blacks are more likely to benefit.
Finally, some whites and blacks who have misgivings about affirm-
ative action altogether find attractive the idea of establishing pro-
grams, particularly in university admissions, where poverty and
competence are the only criteria.1 5 They reason that, because blacks
are disproportionately poor, such programs will inevitably benefit the
black community significantly without race being any consideration
whatsoever. The problem with this approach, however, is that there
112. COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE AMERICAN FRESH-
MAN NATIONAL NORMS FOR FALL 1993, at 84 (1993) (finding that 49.2% of entering
freshman of the most selective nonsectarian institutions had an estimated parental in-
come of $75,000/year; and 60% had an estimated parental income of $60,000/year
while the least selective institutions had a freshman enrollment of 20.9% whose esti-
mated parental income was $75,000 and 33.1 % whose estimated parental income was
$60,000).
113. Race in the Workplace, Bus. WK., July 8, 1991, at 50 (finding that Black
presence at companies with 100 or more employees has increased significantly at all
levels, from 1966 until 1989); A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
336 (Gerald D. Jaynes et al. eds., 1989) (stating that the number of Blacks with 12 or
more years of education increased substantially from 1940-1980); William L. Taylor,
Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1705
(1986); ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UN-
EQUAL 147 (1992); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMA-
NENCE OF RACISM, 142 (1992).
114. HACKER, supra note 113.
115. Paul Starr, Civil Reconstruction. What to Do Without Affirmative Action,
AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1992, at 7, 10; William J. Wilson, Race-Neutral Programs and
the Democratic Coalition, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1990, at 78, 79; WILSON, supra note
20, at 121-24.
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are, in raw numbers, more poor whites than blacks in America. Con-
sequently, it is quite likely that, in many instances, such "poverty-
only" programs would select only whites." 6
What all of this means is that those who resort to hyperbole both
in defending or attacking Title VII and affirmative action with re-
spect to their impact upon poor blacks are misguided. For they de-
mand results that were never intended and are far beyond the ability
of one statute, or a set of targeted race-conscious programs, to
achieve.
CONCLUSION
Forbidden Grounds is undeniably a brilliant, forcefully argued
brief for Professor Epstein's deregulatory mission. But after all is
said and done, insofar as racial discrimination in employment is con-
cerned, it lacks something very important to those of us who care
deeply about ridding America of this ugly social practice. It lacks
reality.
116. The problem with this approach, however, is that, according to SAT scores,
poverty-only affirmative action in college admission will mainly benefit whites and
Asians, since they have better scholastic records. See HACKER, supra note 113, at 138,
141, 146 (discussing SAT score distribution, noting that among low-income students,
blacks do most poorly and that black students from better-off homes, whose parents earn
between $50,000 to $60,000 do not do well on the SAT either, barely matching Asians
from families in the $10,000 to $20,000 range).

